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NON-ANALYTICAL THINKING IN LAW
PRACTICE: BLINKING IN THE FOREST
KANDIS Scorr*
Non-analytical thinking is indispensable to good legal represen
tation. Despite its importance in law practice, it is devalued and ne
glected in the conventional law school curriculum. Even in clinical
legal education, where the potential to teach students to use this mode
of thinking is most obvious, the elevation of theory and analysis has
stifled the impulse of clinical professors to teach students to "blink."
One way law schools can counteract this trend, and thereby better
train law students for practice, is to enhance clinical teachers' non
analytical skills through more practice opportunities.

In Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking,! Malcolm
Gladwell illustrates non-analytical thinking with the story of an art
museum's purchase of an ancient statue for $10 million. Although the
museum based its decision on a fourteen-month evaluation by experts,
other art experts identified the statue as fake or at least "wrong" with
one glance. Unable to articulate the reason for their rejection of the
kouros, they knew the statue was not right.2
The failure of German scientific forestry in the 1700s also demon
strates the inadequacies of systematic analysis.3 The state's foresters
measured and categorized the trees so as to maximize what they saw
as their value: their yield of wood and game. Based on their careful
study and narrow goals, the experts cleared the low-growing vegeta
tion and planted at one time even rows of only one or a few types of
trees. This logical approach allowed scientific experimentation with
fertilizers, rainfall, and weeding. In the short run the forests flour
ished. German forestry science, "a rigorous technical and commercial
discipline that could be codified and taught,"4 something like law,5
*
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1 MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT THINKING

(2005).
2

[d. at 1-11.
JAMES c. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE 11 52 (1998).
4 [d. at 20.
5 Compare the similar deference to law school professors, the legal scientists, that
"arises from a pervasive cultural conditioning in our society to have faith in the unique
general powers of insight of those who have achieved the status of a university professor."
John S. Elson, Why and How the Practicing Bar Must Rescue American Legal Education
From the Misguided Priorities of American Legal Academia, 64 TENN. L. REV. 1135, 11431144 (1997). Elson goes on to note that:
3

-
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became the world's sylvan standard.
No surprise to the modern reader, the scientific forests failed af
ter the second rotation. The foresters encountered the "dangers of
dismembering an exceptionally complex and poorly understood set of
relations and processes."6 They ignored the value of fodder, thatch,
fruits, and materials to make medicines, tanning compounds, resins, or
bedding. The "social uses of the forest for hunting and gathering, pas
turage, fishing, charcoal making, trapping, and collecting food and val
uable minerals as well as the forest's significance for magic, worship,

[and]

refuge"7 also were irrelevant to the scientists' work. The forests

could not withstand the simplification of logic and analysis.
In law, as in forestry, the problems are so rich in uncertainty that
formal organization and simplification are inadequate routes to their
resolution.8 A less logical approach that embraces the complexity of
clients' problems produces better results.

Nevertheless, most law

professors would be prouder of a graduate who used the care and
logic of the German foresters to evaluate a case or a proposed solu
tion to a client's problem than one who, like the art experts, relied on
a more unconscious approach.
Given the preeminence of logical analysis in legal education,
these teachers would be alarmed by an intuitive response like that of
the art experts. Analysis - separating the whole into its parts - is the
means by which lawyers make "complex and unwieldy reality"9 more
legible. The emphasis on analysis in law school is premised on the

The origin of this deference to academics is not at all clear but probably arises from a
variety of factors. Cultural anthropologists have noted that many societies manifest a
type of mythological thinking that venerates the powers of insight conferred on sa
cred wise men or shamans, whose pronouncements serve to relieve the inescapable
sense of insecurity that is part of the life of ordinary individuals. A far simpler expla
nation for the deference many in the practicing bar pay legal academics may be the
'halo effect' phenomenon,which is said to account for the confidence people place in
the generalized expertise of those who have achieved prominence in one field,even
though they have no special insight in the very different field on which they are
expressing judgment, such as occurs when venerated baseball players vouch for
brands of coffee makers or cars. . . . Finally, practicing lawyers' wish to be considered
part of a profession that derives legitimacy from its academic foundations in 'scien
tific' principles may also play a role in the bar's unwillingness to hold legal academics
accountable for prioritizing scholarship at the expense of their professional educa
tional duties. Id.
6 SCOTI, supra note 3, at 2l.
7 /d. at 13.
8 Complex casework affects lawyers' status. Those who practice in fields where rou
tinization suffices, such as landlord evictions,are regarded as having low status. This may
be an unconscious appreciation for the unpredictable challenges in most law practice.
RICHARD L. ABEL, Revisioning Lawyers, in LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: AN OVERVIE W 15
(Richard L. Abel & Philip S.c. Lewis eds.,1995); JEROME E. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR
O WN: THE SOLO PRACTITIONER IN AN URBAN SETTING 184-185,200 (1994).
9 SCOTI, supra note 3, at 11.
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notion that addressing each piece of the client's problem or of a legal
doctrine allows an attorney to control and manipulate the situation.lO
In reality, attorneys cannot control clients' problems so easily. By dis
regarding the inherent complexity of legal problems, teachers fail to
acknowledge the importance of non-analytical problem-solving and
thus fail to adequately prepare students for practice.
A simplified, linear approach does not produce the best legal re
sult any more than it stimulates forest production. The impersonal
rules of law break down in practice where "transient, shifting, discon
certing and ambiguous, situations"ll are the norm. More often than
not lawyers operate in circumstances of uncertainty where legal prece
dents offer little assistance.

For example, they

ask themselves

whether including only the strongest arguments or adding weak ones
to the brief would help the case, or how to adapt to unexpected facts
discovered during negotiation,12 Lawyers must rely on non-analytical
thinking in these situations, thus making it imperative that law schools
look for ways to help students understand the role of intuition in legal
representation.
There are several overlapping explanations of non-analytical
thinking. In actual practice, the finest lawyers, like the intuitive art
experts, know in a blink that certain approaches to a legal problem are
right.13 In Gladwell's terms, they rely on their "adaptive unconscious"

( somewhat

less alarming than pure unconscious when discussing law

practice ) to quickly solve problems when a logical approach would
demand much more time and information. The unconscious mode en

compasses much high-level, sophisticated thinking and can be toggled
to conscious mode when necessary.14 Lawyers are suspicious of rapid,
10 Id. But see Elson, supra note 5, at 1136 ("[T]his argument is that what law schools do
best is teach students the fundamental process of legal analysis. Would this were true!
What law schools actually concentrate on teaching for three years is, first, how to analyze
legal doctrine by defining, contrasting, and systematizing the rules from appellate opinions
and, second, how to construct policy arguments for opposing sides of cases.").
11 MARCEL DETIENNE & JEAN-PIERRE VERNANT, CUNNING INTELLEGENCE IN GREEK
CULTURE AND SOCIETY 3-4 (1991).
12 See SCOTT, supra note 3, at 315.
13 "Discussions with experienced lawyers indicate that for them the valuation of cases
or the determination of break-even points is an almost unconscious calculation that incor
porates past experience and knowledge of settlements and verdicts and their relationship
to the facts of the current case. For this group of lawyers, the valuation process is beyond
articulation and is reflected in comments such as 'It's just a gut feeling'; 'It's looking at
what I believe a jury will believe'; and 'It's like being pregnant; you just have a feeling.'''
Peter Toll Hoffman, Clinical Scholarship and Skills Training, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 93, 116
(1994).
14 PAUL BREST AND LINDA HAMILTON KRIEGER, PROBLEM SOLVING, DECISION MAK.
lNG, AND PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT Ch. 1 at 12 (Aug. 4, 2004) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author).
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unconscious thinking, but Gladwell argues that quick decisions, while
not infallible, can be as good as deliberate ones. The finest litigator
following the rule "listen to the witness" is using his or her adaptive
unconscious to adjust his or her cross-examination to the testimony on
the spot. Gladwell's thesis implies that good lawyers necessarily react
intuitively all the time 1 5 - hardly what is taught in conventional
classes.
Similarly, Brest and Krieger contend that intuitive problem solv
ing depends on matching an external stimulus to a mental "schema."
The schema provides a "pre-scripted plan of perception, deduction,
inference and action" resulting in a seemingly unconscious solution,1 6
much like the "blink" phenomenon.

A "naturalistic approach to

problem solving" permits us to immediately size up a situation, under
stand its meaning and know what action to take1 7 - exactly Gladwell's
point.

The trial lawyer must use this method to quickly decide

whether to object to some witness's testimony.

Brest and Krieger,

however, warn that lawyers may oversimplify problems so that they fit
their expert schemas. An example of this is "premature diagnosis"
that leads an attorney to a mistaken understanding of a client's prob
lem. Moreover, oversimplification robs the client of the nuanced, cre
ative problem-solving that all lawyers aspire to. 1 8
Scott too fears oversimplification in problem solving.1 9 He iden
tifies the origin of non-analytical thinking not in the adaptive uncon
scious, but in metis, "a wide array of practical skills and acquired
15

GLADWELL, supra note 1, at 10-14.
BREST AND KruEGER, supra note 14 (manuscript at 13, 15).
17 Id. at 12.
18 "But most of the time, what makes a creative solution effective is that it does not
come entirely out of left field. In professional practice,an effective creative solution
is most often associated with some expert schema,just not the expert schema auto
matically triggered by habituated patterns of expert thought and action. In this way,
creative professional problem solving tends to combine old things in new ways, or
new things in old ways, but rarely combines new things in new ways. Along these
lines, to function as a creative professional requires more than simple innovation. It
requires mastery, a subliminal awareness of the deep structures embedded in and
embedding distinct but interconnected bodies of profession-relevant knowledge."
Brest & Krieger, supra note 14 (manuscript at 4). Failing to recognize that there are cir
cumstances when lawyers must make decisions deliberatively is another problem with the
use of expert schema. Id. at 12. This constitutes the frightening practice of "shooting from
the hip."
19 Scott, a political scientist, describes the means that States use to control their sub
jects and their environment, such as standardized weights and measures and permanent
last names. Such rationalizing and standardizing introduced social simplifications that did
not represent actual activity of society. SCOTT, supra note 3,at 2-3. These state simplifica
tions are destructive schemes that ignore or suppress the practical skills that underlie com
plex activities. Id. at 310-311. It is this point that links Scott's work to that of clinical law
teachers.
16
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intelligence [used] in responding to a constantly changing natural and
human environment"20 - a kind of practical wisdom arising from ex
perience.21 This ability grows out of engaging with the activity itself,22
not out of abstractions like those mastered in school. Law schools
offer students knowledge that is universal, contextual, and that can be
taught in logical steps as a formal discipline.23 Metis is different from
that kind of lawyers' knowledge because it does not depend on firm
rules, principles, propositions, and logical deductions from them.
Metis can not be communicated through books because it can not be
simplified, as the foresters who made their calculations learned.
There is no doubt that lawyers use non-analytical thinking to
solve clients' problems.

Whether labeled adaptive unconsciousness,

expert schema, or metis, this kind of thinking arises out of experience
with complex, changing yet similar problems. An attorney skilled in
this mode of thinking can more efficiently and more effectively solve
client problems. Unfortunately few law schools have addressed this
mode of learning; most have limited themselves largely to theoretical
and analytical skills.
The traditional apprentice system was the ideal way for lawyers
to acquire metis, to learn how to blink. A law office is a community of
interest holding accumulated information and demanding ongoing ex
perimentation - conditions ideal for the development of metis.24 In
such a situation, the budding lawyer would be exposed to repeated,
but varied factual situations and clients. Through direct observation
the novice would learn the art of lawyering from a mentor-model who
repeatedly acts on implicit and automatic understanding that, like
chicken sexing, can not be explained.25
Given that law schools are now the almost universal way to learn
law,26 what is their role in preparing students to use metis in practice?
20 SCOTT, supra note 3, at 313. Metis does offer an alternative to the related, but rather
informal term "blink. "
21 Metis implies "a complex but very coherent body of mental attitudes and intellectual
behaviour which combine flair, wisdom, forethought, subtlety of mind, deception, re
sourcefulness, vigilance, opportunism, various skills, and experience acquired over the
years." DETIENNE & VERNANT, supra note 11, at 3-4.
22 SCOTT, supra note 3, at 313.
23 Id. at 320.
24 Id. at 334.
25 Chicken sexing is the classic example of a skill that cannot be taught. See Mark
Heyrman, Address at the University of Chicago "Chicago's Best Ideas" lecture series (Feb.
6, 2003), at http://magazine.uchicago.edu/0304/campus-news/; see Richard Horsey, The Art
of Chicken Sexing, 14 UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON WORKING PAPERS IN LINGUISTICS
107, available at http://cogprints.org/3255/0l/chicken.pdf.
26 Law schools offer many benefits over apprenticeships: generalized knowledge (al
beit bereft of a rich context) is more democratically available, thereby offering opportuni
ties to women and those not well connected. See SCOTT, supra note 3, at 335.

HeinOnline -- 12 Clinical L. Rev. 691 2005-2006

692

CLINICAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol.

12:687

Adaptive unconscious can be "educated and controlled;"27 it is more
than mere intuition. Unconscious reactions may not be seen, but one
can learn to interpret what underlies his or her quick judgments and
first impressions.28 Like basketball, legal decision-making depends on
much structured practice,29 which is a different kind of learning from
acquiring information, analyzing, and articulating the logic of a judi
cial opinion.3D Unfortunately, most law schools lack basketball courts
and do not offer years of work with clients as do medical schools.
Classroom study does little to help students build their adaptive un
conscious into a tool that assists clients despite the fact that law prac
tice should be a necessary objective of professional education.3 1 These
inadequacies in preparing students for law practice led law schools to
develop client representation clinical courses,32 a small start in the ac
quisition of expert schema. Yet, even clinical courses give short shrift
to non-analytical thinking.
According to one theory popular in the early days of clinical legal
education, students' education would flow automatically from interac
tions with clients, students, lawyers, judges, and others involved in the
legal system.33 Thus, the pedagogy was to put students and teachers
together representing clients, somewhat like an apprentice system. Of
late, however, most clinical educators have moved away from this de
pendence on practice towards a more analytical approach.34 These
27

GLAD WELL, supra note 1, at 15.
GLAD WELL, supra note 1, at 183.
29 Id. at 114.
30 /d. at 121, 137, 141.
3 1 "[T]oo many members of the law school community are either indifferent to or
hopelessly naive about the problems of legal practice." Harry T. Edwards, The Role of
Legal Education in Shaping the Profession, 38 J. LEGAL. EDUC. 285 (1988). Preparing
students for practice also should influence legal scholarship.
"I suggest that a logical argument can be made for the social utility of legal scholar
ship of four particular kinds. First is scholarship that addresses the operation and
needs of the legal system, and suggests reforms that would make that system more
fair and efficient. Second is scholarship that compiles and systematizes or categorizes
legal doctrine, such as Moore's Federal Practice and Corbin on Contracts. Third is
scholarship that analyzes and suggests effective practice techniques and strategies
such as Mauet's Trial Techniques. Fourth is scholarship that gathers empirical data
and generates from that data predictive, testable hypotheses . . .. [However] the bulk
of legal scholarship is what some critics have termed normative scholarship, which is
scholarship that prescribes courses of action to resolve controversial socio-legal
issues."
Elson, supra note 6, at 1139.
32 Hoffman, supra note 13, at 99; see Larry Kramer, The Necessity of Clinical Educa
tion, 72 STANFORD LAWYER 2 ( Spring 2005).
33 Richard A. Boswell, Keeping the Practice in Clinical Education and Scholarship, 43
HASTINGS L. J. 1187, 1191 (1992).
34 Stephen Wizner, Walking the Clinical Tightrope Between Teaching and Doing, 4 MD.
L. J. OF RACE, RELIGION, GENDER AND CLASS 259, 261 (2004); Gary Palm, at http://maga28
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teachers have absorbed the intellectual values and practices of the
academy into their own work:

"theory emerges from practice and

practice then informs and reshapes theory."35 Institutional culture
may

have

stimulated

this

trend.36

Hoffman

describes

this

phenomenon:
No doctrine or theory underlies many lawyering skills, but instead
only a collection of anecdotal suggestions about how to accomplish
particular tasks. While such suggestions may be helpful to a practic
ing lawyer or law student, they cannot be accorded the status of a
theory or doctrine. The nature of law school faculties and legal edu
cation is such that, until a subject matter can be presented in the
guise of a theory, it will receive little respect or recognition from law
teachers, it will not readily be taught as part of the curriculum, and
there will be little writing about it in the law reviews. Recognition
and acceptance are accorded only to what can be translated into
some form of theory suitable for study.37

Yet theory can limit observations of practice by "render [ing] 'obvious'
facts nearly invisible, by denying them a sensible context."38 This is
the trap the foresters fell into; it is the danger of over-simplifying legal
problems to fit one's schema. Theory-oriented clinics have not ful
filled their potential as places for students to begin to acquire a law
yer's adaptive unconscious.
Given that non-analytical problem solving is necessary for excel
lence in law practice, why are law schools uncomfortable with this
thinking? First there is cultural resistance. Scott captures this by com
paring metis to scientific knowledge:
One major reason why metis is denigrated ... is that its 'findings'

zine.uchicago/9706/9706Law4.html.
35 Elizabeth Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the
Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589,604 (1986); see also DONALD A. SCH ON, EDU
CATING THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: TOWARD A NEW DESIGN FOR TEACHING AND
LEARNING IN THE PROFESSIONS 78-79 (1987) (discussing the desirability of reflective con
versation between theory and practice).
"The degree of abstraction from which a subject is approached can range from the
concrete and wholly particular to the purely theoretical. The best scholarship about
skills should partake of both extremes, by providing a theoretical underpinning for
the analyses being presented and also discussing and presenting the application of
the theory in practice. Theory is necessary for understanding and for the expansion
and extension of the analysis, but it is not alone sufficient."
Hoffman,supra note 12, 114; see also Robert D. Dinerstein, A Meditation on the Theoretics
of Practice, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 971, 984 (1992); Boswell, supra note 32, at 1188-1189.
36 Obviously the standards for tenure, including publication of scholarly writing, press
clinical professors towards theory, but tenure and status issues are not the subjects of this
essay.
37 Hoffman, supra note 13, at 105.
38 STEPHEN JAY GOULD, BULLY FOR BRONTOSAURUS: REFLECTION IN NATURAL HIS
TORY 292-293 (1991).
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are practical, opportune, and contextual rather than integrated into
the general conventions of scientific discourse ....The litmus test
for metis is practical success.39

Practical success is not the goal of most law school education.
Another inhibitor may arise from the fact that students can not
acquire metis or expert schema in three years of school because this
form of intelligence requires many years of practice. Therefore, some
argue that schools should not waste resources on a fruitless effort to
teach non-analytical problem solving.40 However, in no subject area
do schools complete the education of law students. Law schools plant
seeds and offer students tools to assist their professional gardening.
Law schools can teach students that good lawyers do blink and can
show them how that is done.
Third, most present-day clinic teachers had formal, analytic train
ing in lawyering skills when they were students. They became com
mitted to the idea that theory and practice are linked.

Like the

German kings and law professors, these younger practitioners value
"scientific foresters," those who teach the theory of law practice, more
than they value older, experienced attorneys with metis. Even those
teachers who had extensive practice experience before entering the
academy must "talk the talk" of theory and analysis to fit into most
clinical programs.

Given the education and acculturation of most

clinical educators, they themselves may be uncomfortable with a move
towards law school training in non-analytical problem solving because
they see it as a move backwards.
Finally, it is difficult to hire attorneys with metis to teach because,
by definition, they are successful practitioners unlikely to abandon
their work for the low pay and status of a clinical teaching position.41
Those who can develop students' analytical unconsciousness are a rare
breed because they must have both metis and, with the current em39

SCOTI', supra note 3, at 323.
One reason "why students, the bar, and the public should be content with such a
limited ambition for legal education [is] the panoply of professional skills lawyers need is
best left to be learned in the early years of practice." Elson, supra note 5,at 1136. Clinical
teachers must be able to translate their non-analytic thinking so as to discuss the underpin
nings of their intuitive judgments with students. In explaining their decisions to clients,
associates, adversaries, or students, the lawyers process the matter through their conscious
rational mind. This translation makes the "analytic unconscious" conscious. Studies show
that articulating one's reasons for an action impairs the quality of that action, GLADWELL,
supra note 1, at 120, 182; BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE IS
LESS 137 (2004», so only the most expert ca� do what the clinical educators are asked to
do.
41 "Law schools cannot afford to teach those (practice] skills... . [Ljaw schools' role as
university research institutions precludes significantly shifting funding and staffing priori
ties from scholarship to professional education." Elson, supra note 5, at 1136.
40

Spring 2006]

Blinking in the Forest

695

phasis on theory, techne,42 unlike doctrinal teachers who need only
techne. For example, some states, such as California, recognize the
importance of practical wisdom and require two years experience
before a lawyer may supervise a certified law student doing client
work.43 However, in light of the difficulty of attracting experienced
attorneys, law schools find ways to evade this costly requirement.44
One way law schools can improve the teaching of metis is to en
courage clinical teachers to use their sabbaticals, not for writing about
theory, but to increase their professional experience in breadth, depth,
or both. For example Stacey Caplow, a criminal specialist teaching at
Brooklyn Law School, practiced civil law during her sabbatical;45
Paula Galowitz, a clinical professor in the N.Y.U. Civil Legal Services
Clinic practiced international law at the United Nations High Com
missioner for Refugees in Geneva;46 Terry Player from University of
San Diego practiced in new areas of law - civil law firm work, criminal
prosecution, and as a judge pro tem;47 and Cookie Ridolfi of Santa
Clara University refreshed her practice skills in her criminal law spe
cialty.48 Such projects enable less experienced teachers to increase
their own metis and enrich their teaching.49
"The great failure of rationalism is 'not its recognition of techni
cal knowledge, but its failure to recognize any other.' "50 A law school
full of logical German foresters will soon be as unproductive as a sci
entific forest. Law schools should support the efforts of faculty who
can blink to enhance their non-analytical abilities. A legal education
that "excludes or suppresses the experience, knowledge, and adapta
bility of metis risks incoherence and failure; learning to speak coher
ent sentences involves far more than merely learning the rules of .
grammar."51
A law school must clearly and consciously commit to teach metisl
42 Those with techne ask why and how a solution works in an effort to contribute to
wider knowledge. In contrast, one uses metis to solve concrete problems and invent new
solutions to problems. SCOTT, supra note 3, at 323-324.
43 Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 983.2 (2006).
44 In California this is done by having an experienced lawyer sign the official student
certification forms while less experienced lawyers actually supervise student work.
45 Prof. Caplow describes the influence of this experience on her teaching in Stacy
Caplow, A Year in Practice: The Journal of a Reflective Clinician, 3 CUN. L. REV. 1 (1996).
46 Email from Paula Galowitz, Clinical Professor of Law, New York University, to
Kandis Scott, Professor of Law, Santa Clara University (Aug. 8, 2005) (on file with author).
47 Telephone interview with Teresa Player, Professor of Law, University of San Diego
(Aug. 11,2005).
48 Email from Kathleen Ridolfi, Professor of Law, Santa Clara University, to Kandis
Scott,Professor of Law, Santa Clara University (Aug. 23, 2005) (on file with author).
49 CAPLOW, supra note 45.
50 SCOTT, supra note 3, at 430 n. 88.
51 [d. at 319.
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expert schema/blinking because institutional formal education is not
naturally

hospitable

thinking.

to

subtle,

contextual,

experience-dependent

Most law teachers who now recognize the necessity of

clinical training remain uncomfortable with non-analytical thinking.
Even clinical education, ensnared in the culture of legal analysis and
theory, has moved away from using a more purely experiential teach
ing method. Yet clinical education is the most obvious place for de
veloping metis. To enhance this potential, law schools should provide
more opportunities for clinical faculty to cultivate their metis.
Nonetheless, lawyers cannot work by only blinking. Legal educa
tion need not suffer the failure of rationalism: it must teach both ana
lytical and non-analytical thinking.

And, as the experiences of

Professors Caplow, Galowitz, Player, and Ridolfi show, institutional
support of practice opportunities for clinicians will undoubtedly inure
to the benefit of both clinicians and their students.

